For my part, I shall attempt to develop the theme of the connections between nationalism and ethnic identity, in relation to a relatively recent phenomenon like that of "Baluchi nationalism".
By the very fact of establishing that connection, I therefore accept Smith's general indication. My intent however is not exactly to develop an "archaeological" perspective on Baluchi nationalism in an attempt to spot common values and symbols rooted in a pre-existent "ethnic identity". Rather, my purpose would be to highlight the logic of the nationalist "discourse", as developed in Baluchistan in the second half of the twentieth century. By "discourse" I mean (in line with Foucault 1969) a number of enunciations, representations, images and symbols that tend to produce coherencies of meaning. And which thereby tend to mould (shape) the objects they refer to. The "discourse" which I propose to consider is not therefore only the explicit discourse of nationalists, consisting of programmatic statements, political appeals and verbal as well as written theorisations; it is also the discourse which consists of opinions, declarations and feelings, expressed by individuals not directly engaged in politics but who, albeit only broadly, share the sentiments of the nationalists. The "discourse of Baluchi nationalism" is in fact a "fi eld" of resistance, debate and action fuelled by whatever it considers useful in creating an image of the Baluch as a people with a common origin, culture and history.
Baluchi nationalism is a political, ideological and intellectual movement which arose within one of the largest "stateless nations" in South West Asia (estimates of the number of Baluchi speakers oscillate between 18 and 25 million, including migrants working in the Gulf countries and Africa). The idea of Baluchistan as a "nation" was probably fi rst mooted in an article published in 1933 in the Karachi weekly Al Baluch, the offi cial organ of the Anjuman-e Ittihad-e Baluchistan (Organisation for the Unity of Baluchistan). According to that article, "Greater Baluchistan" (as it is called even today by the nationalists) should have included (see the map below) in addition to Iranian Baluchistan and Indian (now Pakistani) Baluchistan, the Sindh, the Bahawalpur region and Dera Ghaza Khan and Ismail Khan areas, considered the point of maximum expansion northwards by the Baluchi during the sixteenth century (Inayatullah 1987: 31-32) . The idea of a "Greater -2 - The fi rst map of "Greater Baluchistan" by Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd, the General Secretary of the Anjuman-e Ittihad-e Balochistan (From Inayatullah 1987) .
Baluchistan" was one of the many projects formulated by those who, between 1920 and 1930, had been trying to picture the future of the Indian Subcontinent after a hypothetical departure by the British. The 1930s projects had no sequel, due to the intervention of the British intelligence who silenced the nationalists, and, after the partition of 1947, to the annexation (in two stages) of Baluchistan by the new state of Pakistan. The nationalistic spirit survived however in the decades that followed, to regain fresh impetus in the seventies.
Memory-archive and memory-function: the Baluchi nationalism and its themes.
Baluchi nationalism raised its head, therefore, and developed as a political sentiment and movement, in response to the presence fi rst of the British, and later of the Pakistanis in the region. As an intellectual and ideological movement, it resulted from the merging of local identity memories and ideas that had arrived with colonial rule. Also among the ideas brought with colonial dominion, in addition to those connected with the nation-state as developed in Europe during the modern age, were those fi ltered through the works of western authors (mainly British) interested in Baluchi history and, more generally, in the history of the populations of the Anglo-Indian empire and its bordering regions.
The distinction between local identity memories and imported ideas is useful. Because, whilst it is true, as Ernest Gellner maintains, that it is nationalism that makes the nation and not the other way round, it is also true that the nationalist issue always refers to values, models, stories, world-views and social practices existing prior to nationalism.
All these elements existing prior to nationalism consist of symbols and behaviours which enable subjects to perceive themselves, by ascription, as belonging to one and the same "group" (Barth 1969 ).
But these values, models, stories, etc, are not always simultaneously active. Indeed, many of them are, so to speak, "dormant" -or to use an expression by Aleida Assmann, stored in what she herself calls the "memory-archive". In her book Erinnerungsräume, Aleida Assmann in fact called an "amorphous mass" the accumulated unorganised memories which can be "used" only if taken into consideration by a "memory-function" that "retrieves" and bends them, so to speak, to its own purpose (Assmann 1999 ).
So we could say that the discourse of Baluchi nationalism is founded on a form of memory-function, which takes elements of the memory-archive and organises them according to a purpose. This perspective has the advantage, over Anthony Smith's idea, of not having to connect in a necessary and organic way the nationalistic sentiment with what he calls "cultural forms, sentiments, attitudes and perceptions expressed and coded in myths, memories, values and symbols", that is to say, in already organised discourses.
Within the memory-function, these ideas, values and behaviours "retrieved" from the memoryarchive interact with other elements which, as I was saying, Baluchi nationalism had absorbed during and after the colonial era: the idea of a nation, as developed in Europe in the modern age, and the theories of western authors interested in the history of the Baluch and of the peoples of the Anglo-Indian empire.
Playing on the interconnection between these elements arising from the memory-archive and ideas more or less recently imported, nationalism organises its memory function in such a way as to bestow coherency on its discourse, and fresh meanings which are the peculiarity of its reasoning.
-3 -In order to make things less abstract, I shall try to show how the memory-archive elements come into the discourse of Baluchi nationalism. For its part, this discourse is organised in relation to ideas of a European origin and as a result of moulding-shaping, as Foucault says, a new "object of refl ection": the legitimacy of Baluchistan as a possible nation-state.
In a very general sense, it can be said that the Baluchi nationalists seek to legitimate their claims by referring chiefl y to the following points: a) both the popular and the cultivated idea that the Baluch have of their own past history: a theme closely linked to the question of b) the ethnogenesis of the Baluch people c) the territorial question and, to a lesser extent, to the d) religious factor.
Origins
Although the Baluch speak a language of "Indo-European" family related to Farsi (Persian), their roots are traced back, traditionally, to Mir Hamza, paternal uncle of the Prophet Muhammad. The reference to this mythic ancestor, chosen probably as such at the time of the Islamization of Baluchistan by the Arabs (in the eleventh century of the Christian era), therefore sets the origins of the Baluch people at the dawn of Islam. The poems and legends passed down orally 2 tell, in eff ect, a story of conquerors originating from the north west. These would appear in fact to have initiated the occupation of the area today called Baluchistan in the eleventh century, which was then completed during the fi fteenth century under the leadership of the legendary "national" hero Mir Chakar Rind. In the course of the fi fteenth and sixteenth centuries, part of the Sindh and of the Punjab fell, in eff ect, under the infl uence of Baluchi chiefdoms, thereby boosting the nationalist image of a "Greater Baluchistan". This is an example of how the memory-archive was exploited to foster, in the vision of the early nationalists, the idea of a country whose borders would extend beyond those recognised today.
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Imagining Baluchistan as a region inhabited by peoples whose ancestors came from an area situated between Mesopotamia and the region south of the Caspian Sea, today's theorists of the Baluchi nation restate the idea of a conquest, or migration, which is not rare in social cosmologies seeking to explain both the origin of a people and rule by one group over others.
The idea of the ethnogenesis of the Baluch tends in fact to reassert both cultural unity and common geographic origin.
This idea of population by groups originating from the west is confi rmed, in the eyes of cultivated nationalists, by the works of western orientalists who, at the end of the nineteenth century tended to present the origins of the Baluchi people in a "migratory" perspective (Janmahmad 1988: 17, 25; Inayattullah 1987: 33) .
In their turn, however, these orientalists based their hypotheses on popular Baluchi tradition itself, and in particular on oral poetry, which began to be translated into western languages towards -4 -2 Baluchi language received signifi cant contributions in lexical, and phonetic terms, from Farsi, Arabic, Pashtu and Urdu. The fi rst attempts at transcription date from the beginning of the 20 th century through the use of the Arab alphabet suitably adjusted to Baluchi phonetics (cf. Sardar Khan Baloch 1977) .the middle of the nineteenth century (Dames 1904 (Dames , 1907 . The "migratory thesis" was a product of the historical perspective which in the meantime had developed in the West on the strength of comparative studies of Indo-European languages (Dames 1904: xiii) . That perspective consisted essentially in an idea of how these languages spread as a result of the "fragmentation" of a ProtoIndo-European society, culture and language into derived and interrelated societies, cultures and languages (Renfrew 1987 ).
But it is not only from these cross-references between one tradition and another that cultivated nationalism gets what it needs to "invent" a tradition, at least in the sense in which the term "invention" is understood by Hobsbawm and Ranger in their classic study of "tradition" (1983) . A sort of local "sociology" (deposited in the "memory-archive") also contributes to its endorsement.
As an example, I recall that during the period of my researches in the south of the country, the morphological characteristics of Baluchi society were seen as a proof of past migrations.
In southern Baluchistan (where the social structure diff ers, as I shall explain better later on, from that of the north), numerous patronymic groups (for the most part endogamous), are present. At a purely representational level, these are the backbone of local society.
These groups (zât) are not concentrated, but scattered very widely across the territory. An analysis of ethnographic data tends to suggest that this dispersion may be related to extremely fl uid residential patterns, which are in their turn a consequence of the local landed estate structure and its management.
Although the principal sources of sustenance of the local populations have by now for quite a while been the remittances of emigrants working in the Gulf region and in the big cities of eastern Pakistan, besides those of commerce, smuggling and heroin traffi cking (Akbar 1989) , agriculture has left on this part of the country an imprint of "longue durée" (to use Fernand Braudel's expression). And this has substantially helped to shape the local social morphology.
Southern Baluchistan is a semi-desert region, crossed by semi-permanent waterways (kaur) along which prevails the cultivation of date palms and cereals. This cultivation is achieved by means of irrigation. The water from each channel (kariz) is divided among a certain number of owners holding hour-quotas (or sub-factions of an hour). At any time the various quotas can be alienated, purchased, inherited, leased or transferred by way of bridewealth or dowry (Fabietti 1996a) . This means that not infrequently an individual may fi nd himself possessing, or at any rate managing, water quotas of diff erent amounts and in diff erent channels which may even be far apart. The residential patterns adopted tend, in this situation, to depend on options and choices that are in their turn infl uenced by manifold factors. The latter may consist in the quality and location of crops; in the water quotas possessed in varying measures and in diff erent oases, and in the location and quantities of those which an individual may gradually come to possess (by inheritance, purchase, marriage, etc.). These, and important factors such as the distance between fi elds, the type of agreement reached with other owners, and a variety of considerations, may all combine to infl uence the choice of residence by a person (Pastner 1972 ).
Many individuals involved in agricultural activities share this interpretation relative to the dispersion of patronymic groups across the territory. But often, if further prompted to refl ect on this morphological characteristic of their society, they tend to interpret the dispersion of patronymic groups also as a consequence of the past invasion.
-5 -In fact, according to this interpretation, the dispersion of patronymic groups is the product of a steady shifting of the various kin groups from west to east. As they advanced they broke up, leaving behind them small groups, families and individuals who eventually formed the nuclei of a demographic growth of diff erent patronymic groups at local levels.
To what extent this interpretation may correspond, in today's political and ideological climate, to the need to supply a "historically" and "sociologically" coherent picture of the present situation is hard to say. Certainly however, this view of the past clings to the idea of a common origin which suff uses the nationalist discourse even in its less radical versions (Inayatullah 1987: 35) . What, though, this discourse "forgets" is the diversity of origins, both cultural and linguistic, claimed by the various groups of which the Baluch people (qowm) are "composed". That diversity is in fact referred to whenever it is no longer a matter of negotiating identity with external agents such as might be the Pakistani state or the international media, but within the context of local politics. In the latter case the superior status of some patronymic groups over others is still decisive (Fabietti 1992) . Especially in the south of the country, which is more exposed to the infl uences of lands beyond the Arabian Sea, some high status groups claim, for example, relatively recent non-Baluchi origins: Arab, Persian, Indian. In the present "independentist" climate, such claims would seem to suggest an explanation of social superiority enjoyed in the past. Nevertheless even today, these distinctions often have an eff ective socio-political bearing on situations. The fact is that both the idea of a common origin, and that of a diff erent origin of the various patronymic groups, in reality project two opposite and alternative images. And in an indirect but decisive way, they inform the political dialectic of today's Baluchi society. These opposite ideas, whilst not excluding each other, are referred to according to whether it is intended to assert the principles of equality, or those of hierarchy and status, as the ideal criteria for regulating social relations. 4 -6 - 4 As I have tried to show elsewhere (Fabietti 1996b) , the Baluchi community, especially in the south of the country, seemed torn, in the 1990s, by a profound contradiction between the two ideals on which it had long been founded, and which could have been translated respectively with the terms equality and hierarchy. The equalitarian image springs from the adhesion to certain models of behaviour which are A village scene in Makran (southern Baluchistan).
As will be noted, the nationalist issue makes reference to the past by combining an epic passed down orally, with a number of historico-linguistic-cultural theories of western origins, and local stories about the origins of the groups which today make up the Baluchi "people".
Unity
But if the medieval epic, with its hero Mir Chakar Rind, the protagonist of poems and ballads (Sardar Khan Baloch 1977) contains "mythic" elements, the reference to a recent past assumes a more concrete meaning that can arouse more immediate reactions. One such case is that of the vicissitudes of the Khanate of Kalat, which was fi nally abolished in 1955, when it ceased to exist offi cially as a semi-autonomous entity and became annexed to the state of Pakistan.
The question of the Khanate is not only a thorn in the side of the nationalists, but also an essential point of reference when affi rming the recent and historically well-documented existence of a political power capable, say the nationalists themselves, of unifying ex Anglo-Indian and now Pakistani Baluchistan.
The question of the status of the Khanate relative to the British is of great importance to the nationalists.
The Khanate reached the acme of its expansion in the eighteenth century, but lost its autonomy under the British policy of indirect rule. However, its position vis-à-vis the British was diff erent to that of many other kingdoms or chiefdoms encapsulated by the Anglo-Indian empire.
Like all the other "principalities" under British dominion and ruled by Hindu (raja) or Muslim sovereigns (nawab), the proto-state of Kalat, led by a khan with autocratic powers, had stipulated a treaty with the British Crown. This (according to nationalists' opinion) allowed it to maintain its own -albeit nominal -condition as an "independent and sovereign state". The newborn Pakistan, however, ignored this detail. Deeming itself to be the legitimate heir to that part of the subcontinent which fell to its lot after the withdrawal of Great Britain, it saw fi t to extend its sovereignty over all the ex-principalities of the region, including the Khanate of Kalat. In 1955, under various types of pressure, both diplomatic and military, Kalat was fi nally absorbed into Pakistan (Harrison 1981; Redaelli 1996) .
Kalat was a long way from being a centralized state. The khan himself was an autocrat within his tribe, but not in a position to impose his will on the chieftains of other tribes that were part of a kind of confederation (Swidler 1979) . Nationalists on the other hand tend to exalt the khan's function, as if this personage had been nothing less than a head of state. In its eff orts to assert the politically -7 -in their turn founded on shared values. Adult men consider themselves to belong to an "equal" community, since they are expected, regardless of their status or occupation, to conform to values perceived as something concretely attainable on a level of individual behaviour. This equalitarian image of society rests on a defi nition of the individual as a "moral" person. But in Baluchi society economic and political relationships are not founded on the free choice of "morally equal" individuals. Even though in decline, or being reformulated due to the eff ect of the new dynamics caused by the gradual insertion of the region into the framework of Pakistani political and economic life, it is the structure of the master-client relationship that dominates in terms of social dynamics. The master-client relatinship was founded, at least ideally, on the diff erences of status between individuals belonging to diff erent patronymic groups. Now it is not infrequent that these diff erences of status are dated back to the foreign origins of the dominant groups, which origins are, in this region, synonymous with the "conquering race". compact character of east Baluchistan under the Khanate, the nationalist argument forgets that the loyalty of tribes to Kalat was sporadic and sometimes obtained by force. To affi rm the culturally homogeneous character of the region, the nationalist argument furthermore interprets in its own way the linguistic data, whereby the Kalat region had long been considered inhabited by populations of origins diff erent to those of the Baluch (Ahmad Yar Khan Baloch 1975; Janmahmad 1988: 162-165) . The view that the Khanate of Kalat off ers a precedent of political autonomy achieved by the Baluch in fact comes up against a fairly big problem. It is well known that the Khanate developed in the centre of a Brahui linguistic area. The Brahui, according to linguists, is a language closely related to the Dravidian dialects spoken by groups which, according to the "migratory" theory of Indo-European peoples, were driven by the latter towards southern India. According to this theory Brahui, spoken to this day in the Kalat region, would be the language of a Dravidian group which in the course of time mingled with neighbouring groups, assimilating their customs and institutions (Bray 1977) .
In Baluchistan the Brahuiphones are concentrated exclusively in the region of Kalat, in what is for the nationalists the cradle of the fi rst historic instance of political unity in Baluchistan. Consideration of the Khanate of Kalat as a precedent of achieved political autonomy clashes, therefore, with a considerable problem, that of a "contradictory" historical and linguistic non-homogeneity between Baluch and Brahui, between "conquerors" (the Baluch) and "dominators of the conquerors" (the Brahui). The questions of the political unity of Baluchistan and that of its cultural homogeneity are in fact, in the nationalist perspective, closely connected.
In eff ect, the culture of Brahuiphones is not distinguished from that of the Baluchi groups any more than the regional diff erences existing between the latter. Brahui itself, for the matter, was infl uenced by Baluchi, Pashtu and Urdu, in the same manner in which Baluchi was infl uenced by these idioms. Brahuiphones are as a rule bilingual and there is nothing, aside from the language used in everyday communication, to distinguish them from other Baluch.
Besides, they speak Baluchi fl uently and declare themselves to be Baluch. They do not even seem to have an ethnic "dual identity" which might be displayed according to context (Barth 1969) . The Brahui are perceived and perceive themselves as Baluch.
However, for the nationalists this factual identity of Brahui-speaking groups is not suffi cient. In their opinion the origins of those speaking the language of the region must comply to the historical role of the Kahnate of Kalat. In other words, it must be possible to attribute an origin (and not so much a culture) to the Brahuiphone valid enough to put them on the same plane as the Baluch.
Not convinced by the theory of European linguists (who postulated the existence of a Dravidian residual linguistic island), nor even by those of the Brahui themselves (who consider themselves Baluch to all eff ects), the nationalists attribute to the groups of the Kalat region a diff erent identity but a common origin. In a perspective of this sort, the Brahui would in fact be neither the descendants of a Dravidian population, nor of an autochthonous group, but of groups with origins similar to those of the Baluch, and who arrived in the Kalat region during the same period as that of the largescale Baluchi migrations. This is explicit in those nationalist authors who strive to assert the contemporary nature of the Baluchi and Brahui migrations, attributing the character of a historical "proof" to the myth of the origin of both peoples: if the Baluch are descendants of Mir Hamza who originated from the Arab Peninsula, the Brahui are the descendants of a certain Braho, or Ibrahim, originating from Aleppo and companions in arms and faith of the former (Janmahmad 1988 ).
-8 -So for the nationalist argument, the elements legitimating the unifying role of the Khanate of Kalat lie in the common origins of the Brahuiphone and of the Baluch, and thus in terms of a common historical destiny. This began, once again, with the migration of conquering peoples from the west towards the east and was achieved in historical times with the unifi cation of a great part of Baluchistan under the Khanate.
Linguistic diff erence thus becomes an altogether secondary and almost insignifi cant element. For it is, so to speak, reabsorbed and erased in a common original history.
"Politologists in a balloon"
The "cultured" discourse of nationalism (Janmahmad 1988: 259-69; Inayatullah 1987: 35-36) taken into consideration so far reveals an intertwining of ideas and representations belonging both to the experience of European nationalism and to the Baluchi memory-archive; both to the discourse of European historical science and to the local representation of recent political history. This discourse fl ows, we may say, into what Ulf Hannerz has called geocultural imagination. In Hannerz's words, geocultural imagination would be "a matter of fairly large-scale mapmaking", a way of referring "to the distribution of things cultural, somehow cultural, over territories and their human populations" (Hannerz 2007) .
At the same time the expression "geocultural imagination" is a way of "suggesting that [we are] focusing on the way we think geoculturally, about the world and its parts, and the main features of those parts." "In anthropology, geocultural construction work and critique -he goes on to say -were early ingredients of the discipline in Europe as well as North America, in continental Kulturkreislehre as well as in the careful mapping of trait distributions to establish the culture areas of Native Americans." Yet, continues Hannerz, "in those days, a century or so ago, these were mostly activities of the ivory tower, where scholars would argue over matters of conceptualization and categorization mostly with their peers. In more recent times, it seems to me that the geocultural imagination has become more volatile, occurring in both academic and public arenas and also crossing the boundaries between them more readily, and more ambiguously."
These geocultural representations are, according to Hannerz, "signifi cant components in a transnational collective consciousness, a set of representations of the world which are circulated, received and debated in a world-wide web of social relationships, and which again stimulate further cultural production." They are representations aff ecting broad strata of world society, thanks to the spread of literacy and, especially to the medium of television.
Geocultural imagination, during the 1990s, had its maximum propagators in a number of "organic intellectuals", the kind of people who refi ne and explicate the perspectives of a certain political class of which they are in some way members. For example, Huntington, Kagan, Fukuyama, to mention only the best-known, "served in Washington in one administration or another." The bestknown among these, Samuel Huntington, has linked his name to the geocultural image of a "clash of civilizations", where the reduction of culture to religion is a fundamental pillar of his argument (Huntington 1996) . This image of the cultural dynamic is one of those which Cliff ord Geertz -9 -would readily have defi ned as typical of "politologists in a balloon" (Geertz 1999) . In fact, whilst we have to recognise the extraordinary power of persuasion exerted by it in terms of geocultural imagination, we must also underline its poor analytical capacity at an ethnographic level.
There is no doubt that when the idea of a "Greater Baluchistan" was enounced in 1933, geocultural imagination was already present among the Baluchi nationalists themselves. We can, however, also note that the idea of a Greater Baluchistan changed according to specifi c political strategies and moments. It is in fact possible to note these changes by comparing the various versions of this idea that have succeeded one another in time. For the nationalists of 1933, "Greater Baluchistan" should have embraced, in addition to the Iranian and Indian (now Pakistani) Baluchistan, the Sindh, the region of Bahawalpur and the Dera Ghaza Khan and Ismail Khan areas. Strangely, Afghan Baluchistan was not mentioned (and thus not even indicated on the annexed map). The reason for this omission is that at the time Afghanistan was already a sanctuary and a potential ally of the Baluchi nationalists, as it was also to have been in the years 1970-80, thanks to the then pro-Soviet and anti-Pakistan government in Kabul. In the mid-twentieth century on the other hand, the idea of a Greater Baluchistan again included Afghan Baluchistan, whilst the northern region of Dera Ghazi Khan had disappeared -but only to return in the 1990s as a topic of debate. Set on the north east limits of what is considered the maximum point of expansion of the Baluch during the sixteenth century, this area became once again the focus of attention by the nationalists after the possibility of important uranium deposits had been suggested in the neighbourhood.
It can thus be noted that geocultural imagination -the representation of spaces "containing" dominant cultural forms -changed according to periods, but also above all to contingent political circumstances. It is largely a mental construction, whose "form" depends on discursive strategies "useful to the purpose" at diff ering times.
However, as we were saying, these geocultural representations are analytically ineff ective, since they reduce the cultural complexity to a few "essential" traits. They are in fact promptly belied by practice.
I mentioned earlier the best-known case of geocultural imagination: that of the reduction of culture to religion, carried out by Huntington in his celebrated book of 1996. It is interesting therefore to see the place of religion in the Baluchi nationalist discourse and in the eff ective behaviour of those who share it. Baluchi nationalism is in fact a secular movement, having no organic connections with Sunnite religious circles.
The "religious question"
The Baluch are for the most part Sunnite Muslims, but a substantial minority are believers in Zikr, a form of worship dating to 16 th century that has references to Shiite Islam and is particularly widespread in the south of the country as well as among Baluch migrants in Sindh and in the Gulf area.
Still in the eighteenth century, almost the whole of the population of southern Baluchistan was of Zikri faith. Only then did this "confession" begin slowly to decline, so slowly that by the end of the nineteenth century the Anglo-British administrator-ethnographers, in recording their high number, were quick to consider them a veritable "tribe" (Baluchistan District Gazetteer, 1906) .
The decline of Zikr towards the middle of the eighteenth century was a consequence of military intervention by the Khan of Kalat, which smashed the "separatism" of the lords (hakim) in the southern regions (who at the time were followers of Zikr) by conducting nothing short of a jihad against the "Zikri infi dels". After the local lords, defeated and deprived of much of their autonomy, had been converted to Sunnite orthodoxy, the Zikri were left free to practise their worship. Although a part of the population with time did abandon Zikr, following the example of their local lords, the presence of this cult nevertheless remained strong in the region. In the mid-1990s the principal Zikri sanctuary, not far from the city of Turbat, was still attracting yearly, at the end of the Muslim month of Ramadan, some thirty thousand pilgrims from all corners of Pakistan.
Since the mid-eighteenth century there has been no further contrast between Zikri and Sunnites. Zikri, as recently as in the 1990s, still had no diffi culty at all in proclaiming their religion and practising it throughout Baluchistan.
However, from the mid-1980s, Zikri have been the object of attacks, and not only verbal ones, by Sunnite mullahs (Ahmed 1987) .
Having come from regions outside Baluchistan and organized expeditions of non-Baluchs into the south of the country, these mullahs, connected with the Koranic schools situated in the northern and eastern regions of Pakistan, attempted to raise the question of what they consider to be heresy. Their attempts however did not produce the results expected by the promoters of these "punitive expeditions".
The Sunnite Baluch in fact saw these raids led by "fanatical mullahs" (as they call them) as nothing more than one of the numerous plots woven by the government to foment disagreement among the Baluch themselves.
During the years of my research (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , the friction between orthodox non-Baluchs on the one hand, and Zikri and Sunnite Baluchs on the other, had several times risen to a considerable level of danger, to a point where even those in power locally (and who, according to the nationalists, were deeply compromised with central government), had openly declared themselves in favour of religious freedom and of the Zikris' right to practise their beliefs.
But what is the attitude of the nationalists towards the religious question? The idea of the mullahs' raids as the product of destabilization plans by the Islamabad government did not seem at that time to have serious foundations. But if one looks at the reasons given by Pakistani governments to justify the annexation of Baluchistan, it can be noted that the one adopted most frequently has been that of "religious unity" i.e. "purity" of the country. Pakistan means in fact the "Land of the Pure".
One should not be surprised therefore if nationalism regards incursions of fanatical mullahs as manoeuvres aimed to create a state of division and confusion among the Baluch.
If religious foundamentalism is recognized as an element of anti-Baluch policy, the nationalist argument shows a tolerance in matter of faith, and even a clear inclination towards secularism. And to the point where the holy war waged by the Khan of Kalat against the Zikri more than two centuries ago is considered a marginal episode, in keeping with the idea of the Khanate as a political precedent of historically largely achieved unity. This is just one example of how, on a practical level, representations of a culturally homogeneous Baluchistan with no internal diff erentiations disappear altogether in terms of geocultural imagination, where again the propagandist element blots out all the others.
We must therefore concentrate on the socio-political context within which the nationalist discourse operates.
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The social basis of nationalist movement
In the light of the grand historico-cultural visions embraced by the Baluch nationalists, there exist in fact, within the latter, diff erent attitudes to the "Baluchi question". There are not only diff ering political options, depending on one ideological choice rather than another (for example the contrast, in the 1980s, between Marxists and non-Marxists); there are also diff erences relating to the social history of the diff erent areas of Baluchistan itself. One diff erence which, from this angle, seems to me very important is that between the north and the rest of Baluchistan. The North is by tradition the land of the great tribes and tribal leaders (sardàr). The south is on the other hand characterized by the presence of a heavily stratifi ed agricultural society founded on the patron-client relationship (Fabietti 1992) . This diff erence has repercussions on the type of relationship that exists between the Baluchi community and the state of Pakistan.
The tribes of the north interact with the external powers (now with the Pakistani state) through their traditional leaders. It is true that in the south too, the key exponents of this policy belong to the upper echelons of the hierarchy, but the morphology of local society makes the following of a prominent leader less stable and reliable than in the north.
In the north we fi nd a structure of relationships that falls roughly into the category of "segmentary" societies. Every large "tribe", qowm, is composed of a series of lineages", khel, each with a sardàr of its own (Pehrson 1966: 17-18) . From one of these khel comes the "tribal" sardàr, an offi ce passed down by inheritance within a single lineage, and called, in fact, sardàr khel. The lineages making up a "tribe" are thought of as descending from a common ancestor, from whom, however, not all are "equidistant".
5 Indeed the sardàr khel, that is to say the lineage to which the tribal chief belongs, is considered genealogically "closer" (i.e. descending in direct line) to the tribal ancestor.
In southern Baluchistan on the other hand, the khel system is absent, whilst the patron-client relationship prevails. This constitutes the foundation of a stratifi ed society, in which individuals recognise their subordination to other individuals. The relationship of dependency that binds many individuals without means to a mastèr (literally "the biggest"), is certainly binding but is in some ways less "constrictive" than tribal affi liation. The relationship between client and master is in fact confi gured as one of dependency which can be interrupted by means of affi liation, by a client, to a new mastèr. The absence of "tribal" bonds therefore makes the following of a mastèr potentially more "unstable" than that of a sardàr and, above all, less "morally" pledged to his service. This could help to explain why the leading fi gures of Baluchi nationalism have been -with rare exceptions -tribal sardàrs, and why the armed confl ict waged in the seventies was mainly provoked by the large tribes of the north bound to their sardàr (Harrison 1981; Redaelli 1996) .
The particular position occupied by the sardàrs, which in the past allowed some of them to present themselves as champions of Baluchi independence, is however not without contradictory aspects. There are nationalists sardàrs who have been accused, both by the nationalists themselves and by the central government, of adopting a "conservative" attitude to the Baluchi question, allegedly determined by calculations of personal opportunity.
6
-12 - 5 There exists in fact a grading in the "distance" of the various khels of the apical ("tribal") ancestor. This diff erence of distance is sometimes imputed by members of the society themselves to the fact that some khels, especially the more "distant" ones, are allegedly of a diff erent tribal origin. 6 Cases are cited of sardàrs who allegedly urged their tribes to refuse the building of roads and schools To consider the sardàrs conservatives in bad faith is perhaps a bit too simple (some have paid for their anti-government attitude with prison, exile and even death). However, this situation does testify, on the whole, to the contradiction that exists between aspirations to unity and autonomy on the one hand, and to "tribal particularism" on the other. The ambiguity of the sardàrs' attitude seems to be not so much the product of personal calculations as of the position that they occupy in the context of relations between Baluch and Pakistani central government. The sardàrs occupy a prominent position within a socio-politically "tribal" structure, seen by a part of nationalist thinking as an obstacle to the realization of its designs.
Baluchi nationalism thus seems to be marked by a twofold character, that of the tribes and that of Baluchi "modernist" educated people who consider the so called "tribalism" to be a force contrary to the achievement of the region's independence in a manner inspired by the idea of a Baluchi culture and "national" society. However much one may strive to promote in various ways an image of the Baluch people released from the tribal heritage, for example by affi xing to personal documents not "tribal" names but very simply the wording "Baloch" as a "surname" -it is nevertheless true that anti-Pakistan mobilization has occurred to date mainly in the light of political choices -and not always clear ones, made by the sardàr (Harrison 1981; Titus 1990) .
As in all phenomena defi nable as "nationalism", the appearance of national unity and identity in Baluchistan is not simply the eff ect of a demand from within local society. Rather, it is the result of an inner sentiment prompted by external forces. This external force coincides with a large number of factors. Firstly, the Pakistani state which tends, like any state, to impose its authority on the territories under its jurisdiction. Then there are the other states in the region, and the non-Asian powers that have at times exerted dramatic pressure on Baluchistan.
It would however be reductive to maintain that colonization or violence on the part of an outside power can, as such, spark a form of reaction self-proclaimed as nationalist. Baluchistan had been subjected for centuries, if not for thousands of years, to the pressure of foreign powers, but of course this fact had never until recently been the origin of anything that might be qualifi ed as "nationalism".
With British and subsequently Pakistani rule, something however did change. Education reached Baluchistan and schools, though overcrowded and with ill-prepared teachers, were opened, with a University in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan. As a consequence, thousands of young people have had access to information and professional qualifi cations that do not fi t a society of pastoral herders and date palm growers. It is no coincidence that the two students' organizations, the Baluchistan Student Organization and a dissident part of it, have several thousand members and that, still more signifi cantly, they represent the two most active political movements in Baluchistan.
It is true that some nationalists see the development of educational facilities and services by the Pakistan authorities as an attempt to favour certain classes and thus to break up the solidarity of the Baluch to the advantage of the government, besides being a quite insuffi cient remedy for the -13 -on their territories, with the excuse that too rapid modernization would have had traumatic eff ects on the population. This kind of refusal has been interpreted by some nationalists as proof of bad faith on the part of the sardàrs, who, they allege, are afraid of loosing their privileges. These sardàrs reply to this accusation by upholding the idea of an autonomous Baluchistan whose population should be entitled to preserve its customs and institutions. growth of the region. But this development of educational structures has produced an entirely new situation. In it young Baluch aspire to fi nd a place for themselves in a world quite diff erent to that of the past generations. However they are frustrated in these aspirations, by a state that is unable to guarantee access to new conditions of life to all the offi cial "ethnic groups" living on its territory. This is all the more true in the case of conditions which the presence of the state has contributed to create.
The presence of a state as such today, tends in fact to set the condition for a greater mobility of individuals and for increased communication between the diff erent sectors of society.
In this sense those, like Gellner (1983) , who consider nationalism to be a product of "modernity", are right.
So it seems that nationalism emerges where, with the widening of a situation of diff erence perceived at the ethnic and cultural level, a gap arises between the system of expectations and the possibility of actually fulfi lling those expectations.
